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What’s new: An Op-Ed on the FCC’s PNT inquiry and NextNav’s petition from RNT Foundation board member GEN William Shelton, USAF (ret).
Why it’s important: A number of bad things would happen if the FCC were to grant NextNav’s petition:
- It would be giving away about $5B worth of spectrum to fund a system that would not do what it’s proponents claim.
- Other, more capable PNT systems and companies would suffer because NextNav’s system would be the one chosen and funded by the feds. Even if (when) it failed to become a reality, innovation and the market would be depressed for years.
- NextNav’s use of the spectrum, according to many, would interfere with existing users like tolling systems (think Easypass, if you are in the eastern U.S.).
What else to know: GEN Shelton was commander of the USAF’s Space Command and has immense credibility in this area.
The FCC must strengthen GPS resilience
By William Shelton
The United States depends on GPS for national security, critical infrastructure, and nearly every aspect of modern life. This dependence has grown to the point where a member of the National Security Council described GPS as a “single point of failure” for the nation. Increasing threats of GPS jamming, spoofing, and satellite disruptions by global adversaries highlight the urgent need for a robust GPS backup system.
Recognizing this, Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr announced that the commission will vote on March 27 to issue a notice of inquiry exploring positioning, navigation, and timing, or PNT, systems as “complements or alternatives” to GPS. Rather than endorsing a single solution, the FCC is taking the prudent step to examine a range of technologies to enhance national resilience.
As part of this discussion, the FCC received a petition from NextNav, Inc. to change the 902-928 megahertz band rules substantially. NextNav requests a spectrum reallocation to operate 5G mobile phones and base stations and then use the 5G positioning capabilities to build its proprietary terrestrial positioning, navigation, and timing, or T-PNT, system. This proposal does not align with the robust, multilayered approach needed for true GPS resilience.
I’ve seen GPS grow into a remarkable system, but it is also a fragile one. Its signals, while accurate and globally available, are also weak by design and increasingly susceptible to interference. Criminal organizations have exploited this vulnerability to hijack cargo shipments, while hostile nations like Russia and China have demonstrated their capability to jam or spoof GPS signals on a large scale. Russia, in particular, has openly threatened to disrupt GPS networks as a strategic weapon. Likewise, China’s publications indicate that space systems are viable targets for interference or destruction in conflict. The risk is real, and the U.S. must address alternatives to GPS with a serious, scalable solution.
Unfortunately, NextNav’s proposed system does not meet that standard. It relies on a network of 5G base stations with quadruple coverage, which would require massive infrastructure investments beyond what cellular networks have spent decades building. In my view, the company lacks the partnerships, funding, and logistical capability to deploy such an extensive network. And even if NextNav were to collaborate with cellular providers, there would still be substantial gaps in coverage, particularly in rural, mountainous, and maritime areas where quadruple base station coverage is untenable. A truly resilient PNT solution cannot afford such gaps.
More concerning, NextNav’s approach lacks diversity in signal origin. A single, proprietary system operating in the same band as unlicensed devices is just as vulnerable to disruption as GPS, if not more so. A true backup must incorporate diverse, independent sources — such as terrestrial broadcasts, fiber-based timing, and alternative satellite networks — to ensure redundancy and resilience.
The FCC’s NOI will likely reveal that NextNav’s system is not the only viable T-PNT alternative. Multiple companies already provide superior PNT capabilities without demanding dedicated spectrum allocation. For example, the Broadcast Positioning System, developed by the National Association of Broadcasters, leverages existing digital television infrastructure to deliver PNT signals. The eLoran system, a modernized low-frequency navigation system, provides wide-area coverage and is operational in countries like the United Kingdom, China, and South Korea. Locata and PhasorLab offer facility-based precision timing solutions that do not require additional spectrum allocations.
Given this array of alternatives, it is encouraging that the FCC is initiating a process to foster competition and innovation rather than favoring a single proprietary system. The best path forward is a robust, multilayered approach and not regulatory favoritism.
The federal government has recognized the need for resilient PNT infrastructure. The National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board has highlighted this for many years. The FCC should not address this issue in isolation, particularly when its decision could have long-term consequences for spectrum users nationwide. Instead, a lead federal agency should be appointed to oversee stronger interagency coordination and a competitive selection process, ensuring the best outcome for commerce, technology, and national security.
Given our dependence on GPS, the U.S. cannot afford shortcuts in GPS security. Threats from adversaries demand a well-thought-out, multi-layered approach. A competitive framework will ensure America builds the resilient PNT infrastructure it truly needs. Anything less is a dangerous gamble.
Retired Gen. William Shelton, U.S. Air Force, is the former commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command. He serves on the National Space-Based PNT Advisory Board, and on the Board of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, an organization that advocates for policies to protect, toughen, and augment America’s PNT capabilities.
