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What’s new:
- The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Air Transport Association met last month to discuss “mitigating GNSS interference risks.” They developed a set of recommendations for airlines and National Aviation Authorities.
- The output of the workshop is an expansion of the results of a similar event in early 2024.
- It seems that these will be considered by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at an upcoming meeting.
Why its important:
- GNSS disruption can cause aircraft to crash and people to die. See the near loss in Sun Valley and the deaths of 38 people in Kazakhstan on Christmas.
- It can also slow down the entire air traffic system causing significant increases in transit time, fuel costs, passenger delays, etc.
What else to know:
- EASA and IATA met about 18 months ago on the same topic and developed a shorter but similar list of recommendations. The results of the meeting this year in many ways are a refinement of last year’s.
- The recommendations are, of necessity, fairly general. If and how they are implemented will be up to national authorities.
Comparing outputs from last year and this year:
2024
- Reporting and sharing of GNSS interference event data. In Europe, this would occur through the European Occurrence Reporting scheme and EASA’s Data4Safety programme. As this is a global problem, it is important, for a better and complete understanding, to join all the information available from reports by connecting the databases such as IATA’s Flight Data Exchange (FDX) or Eurocontrol EVAIR. This topic will be included in the discussions among all interested stakeholders, which will be launched following this workshop.
- Alerting: EASA will inform the relevant stakeholders (airlines, air navigation service providers (ANSPs), manufacturing industry and airports) about attacks.
2025
Enhanced Reporting and Monitoring
- Agree on standard radio calls for reporting GNSS interference and standardised notice to airmen (NOTAM) coding, i.e. Q codes.
- Define and implement monitoring and warning procedures, including real-time airspace monitoring.
- Ensure dissemination of information without delays to relevant parties for formal reporting.
2024
- Guidance from aircraft manufacturers. This will ensure that aircraft operators are well equipped to manage jamming and spoofing situations, in alignment with EASA’s Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) 2022-02R2.
2025
Prevention and Mitigation
- Tighten controls (including export and licensing restrictions) on jamming devices.
- Support the development of technical solutions to:
- reduce false terrain warnings;
- improve situational interference with portable spoofing detectors; and
- ensure rapid and reliable GPS equipment recovery after signal loss or interference.
2024
- Backup: Aviation must retain a Minimum Operational Network (MON) of traditional navigation aids to ensure there is a conventional backup for GNSS navigation.
2025
Infrastructure and Airspace Management
- Maintain a backup for GNSS with a minimum operational network of traditional navigation aids.
- Better utilise military air traffic management (ATM) capabilities, &including tactical air navigation networks and real-time airspace GNSS incident monitoring.
- Enhance procedures for airspace contingency and reversion planning so aircraft can navigate safely even if interference occurs.
Coordination and Preparedness
- Improve civil-military coordination, including the sharing of GNSS radio frequency interference (RFI) event data.
- Prepare for evolving-threat capabilities, also for drones.
NOTES:
- The EASA press release on this says the two organizations “published a report.” We checked and the only thing published out of the workshop was the press release. They are considering changing the wording in the press release.
- EASA, IATA, and ICAO are only able to make recommendations. Any action must be taken by national authorities, companies, or individuals.
