Image: CoPilot AI
What’s new: An opinion piece by the CEO of Cailabs, a company that develops operational optical ground systems for laser communications, including optical ground stations for secure, high capacity space and defense networks.
Why it’s important: This piece is from an informed professional observing space from a bit of an adjacent discipline. He makes some great points that are somewhat common sense, though not all space-professionals seem to have internalized them. While he mostly discusses communications systems, they can apply to PNT and other capabilities. For example (text in parens and italics added):
- “Part of the solution to this problem is to diversify”
- “Any enemy will look for vulnerabilities in whatever equipment and processes military forces use”
- “Switching between satellite networks, using communications (or navigation) equipment on the ground, or relying on other forms of technology that make jamming difficult are all viable ways to protect the integrity of satellite communications (and PNT) for military (and civil) purposes.
- “A satellite does not have to suffer damage for an adversary to leave those who depend on it unable to communicate (or navigate and have timing) when they most need to.”
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Jamming is a much bigger problem than we think
Last month, a Russian Kosmos military satellite came within a few hundred metres of an American commercial satellite operated by ICEYE. The ICEYE satellite provides imagery to Ukraine’s armed forces. The incident elicited warnings from Washington and renewed fears that Russia might attack Western satellites in orbit. If anyone outside Moscow knows what the Russian spacecraft was doing, they haven’t made it public, although the movements of the Kosmos spacecraft were plainly deliberate. The prospect of hostile satellites chasing one another through space is certainly alarming. But military planners have another, less conspicuous threat to contend with, and good reason to suspect that it is far more widespread than we have been led to believe.
Modern armed forces depend on satellites for much of what they do. Readers of SpaceNews know this. Commanders use them to gather intelligence, track enemy movements, guide weapons, communicate with troops and more. In Ukraine, satellite networks have helped soldiers coordinate operations even when Russian forces have destroyed or damaged infrastructure on the ground. Many of these services depend on radio signals. And so an enemy who interferes with those signals can deprive soldiers of vital information — with potentially lethal consequences — without coming anywhere near the satellites themselves.






