Blog Editor’s Note: A very timely headline given the GAO report released this week suggesting the same thing for the U.S. Department of Defense. A good read on the UK perspective.
Save the date! – RNT Foundation and the Hoptroff organization (quoted in the article) are planning a webinar about GNSS timing vulnerabilities and the UK’s plans to institute a national timing infrastructure. Tentative date is either the 22nd or 23rd of June.
Countering the threat of GPS disruption with more resilient PNT sources
In light of the recent increase in state-sponsored cyberattacks, there has been much speculation around spoofing global navigation satellite systems and the susceptibility of these systems. Alex Love explores how this has led defence departments to consider more resilient sources of place, navigation and time signals
A surge in electronic attacks against global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) in recent years has highlighted the need for more robust protection against disruption to place, navigation and time (PNT) data.
GNSS or GPS spoofing is one of the most commonly deployed attacks and involves broadcasting signals with false information that imitate those from genuine satellites. Other methods of attack include carrier jamming, signal jamming, and rebroadcasting.
With so much of the world’s critical infrastructure dependent on GNSS, organisations need to be prepared for unexpected interruptions to services. If a ship or vehicle relies on false navigation data, the results could be disastrous. Governments around the world are taking such threats seriously.