Image: Russia’s Internavigation Research and Technical Centre of Advanced Navigation
Blog Editor’s Note: This makes all kinds of sense.
Another thought – Russia has a huge military presence in Syria. If they were to establish a Chayka/Loran station there, it could extend coverage to the whole Eastern Mediterranean. An area for which the U.S. Maritime Administration is always issuing advisories for GPS jamming and spoofing.
Russian military doctrine assumes GLONASS and other GNSS will not be available once a battle begins, so will instead turn to Loran-C for navigation
Russian forces are expert at jamming and spoofing GNSS. As a result, military analysts say, Russian military doctrine assumes that signals from space, including it’s own GLONASS and other GNSS, will not be available once a battle begins.
According to the Russia and CIS Radionavigation Plan, the terrestrial Chayka system, a version of Loran-C, is maintained to protect their homeland with navigation and timing services when signals from space are not available. The portable Skorpion system is designed for military use during expeditions to areas where Chayka or Loran is not available, according to western military analysts.
“Fixed Chayka transmission sites operate between 90 Khz and 110 Khz. Power output is typically between 200 and 800 kW with effective ranges over land of about 800 miles and over water of 1,000 miles,” explained Dana Goward, president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He noted that little information is publicly available about the military Skorpion system.
“Three of Russia’s Chayka/Loran stations have Ukraine surrounded,” explained UrsaNav CEO Charles Schue, referring to a graphic he provided GPS World. “They provide ideal coverage and will allow navigation accuracy of between 20 and 50 meters over most of the Ukraine. Upgrading to an eLoran equivalent could give them 5-to-10-meter accuracy, but I am sure the current setup is more than adequate for their purposes at the moment.”