





https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhAh-vpuGCg

## Problem - GPS is everywhere



# DHS — "GPS is a single point of failure for Critical Infrastructure"




# But first, there was Jamming



















Seconds, Minutes

Weeks +



#### Result 2: GNSS Denial Events








**European Commission Project** 



#### Result 3: Durations of interference events

#### ALL events (450,363 events)




Most events are very short durations

Most events are very short durations 12% of ALL events are greater than 60 seconds


#### Some findings:

- 7191 events > 5 minutes
- 1112 events > 30 minutes
- 610 events > 60 minutes
- 5 events > 1 day
- Longest event = 5 days

#### High Priority events (73,723 events)



#### 34% priority events are greater than 60 seconds







### Result 5: Comparisons of Sites

- Results from 8 Airport installations
- Most are "national" airports. Most are air-side installations.
- 30 days data (may not be the same 30 days)

	RFI events	Jammers	Jammer/events ratio	Duration > 60secs	GNSS denial	Denial/events ratio
National Airport	8716	95	1%	282	362	4%
National Airport	759	27	4%	200	211	28%
National Airport	2764	595	22%	395	753	27%
Regional Airport	556	31	6%	6	95	17%
National Airport	904	168	19%	158	182	20%
National Airport	776	19	2%	101	35	5%
National Airport	1819	73	4%	9	252	14%
National Airport	4519	133	3%	352	153	3%

- Helps to diagnose issues with unintentional interference & jamming
- Helps to compare with other sites








### **European Commission Project**


STRIKE3

USB L1/L2 jammer


#### STRIKE3 shows Jammer industry is evolving...




5Mhz bandwidth, 1575Mhz centred



8Mhz bandwidth, drifting centre







Waveform detected at 4 STRiKE3 sites Europe and outside EU












# Domestic US Jamming

"GPS Disruption Halts Ports, Endangers Ships" – US Coast Guard






GPS Disruption Halts Wireless Provider in Kansas, 150 Mile -Wide Area Impacted

## Domestic US Jamming

Qulsar Sees About 3 Jamming Events a Day Near San Jose Airport - Impact Unknown







**GPS Tracker Shows Child** 90 Miles From School

# **Spoofing** — Hazardously Misleading Information December 2011



## Spoofing Demo

June 2012

University of Texas,

Austin

**Prof Todd Humphreys** 



## **Spoofing Demo**

June 2013




https://www.youtube.com/watch?time\_continue=17&v=ctw9ECgJ8L0

# Tutorial – Build Your Own GPS Spoofer

December 2015



Hackers Convention
Las Vegas



## First Open Source Spoofing Report

December 2015

DHS: 'Drug Traffickers Are Spoofing Border Drones' – Defense One






January 12, 2016

Reposition 2 RCB 90s from Kuwait to Bahrain through International Waters







January 12, 2016

# Spoofing?





Spoofing?

- Right after US/Iran nuclear agreement
- Same day as President's last major speech to the nation




- Right after US/Iran nuclear agreement
- Same day as President's last major speech to the nation

### Pokémon Go -

Location Deception for All

July 2016




Software Defined Radio



Lifestyle Culture Travel Education Business His

### Why is the Kremlin 'transporting' GPS users to Vnukovo airport?

LIPESTYLE OUT 30 2010 YEKATERINA BINELSONIKOVA. RETH





Oct 21 2016 - 8310

#### The Kremlin Eats GPS for Breakfast

Why geolocation in central Moscow has become a real headache

October 2016



#### September 2017











June 2016: First Public Reports of GNSS Spoofing Near Kremlin






June 2017, M/V Atria




UKRAINE





According to AIS: all ships in the area are next to each other. There were actually no radar echo there.

#### June 2017, M/V Atria

Images
CAPT Gurvan LE MEUR
Motor Vessel Atria








Martne Traffic

PRINCED INJURA A PERE

to the burner






July 2017

Hi April 15 Restart Surgerier 15 Super My Assessed 15 Nov. Sale 16 Starting Starting

**SWITCH** 

Grand)


and amountained - total dead had






VESSEL TIMELINE


Andrews - Different Contraction of the Con-
















## GPS Spoofing Nails Cell Phones in Portland



Oct 2017



June 2018


Easily Spoofing Them All at Once – Inside GNSS

Spoofing GPS & Your Maps – Next Level of Danger




Virginia Tech & China Institute
July 2018


## **Spoofing** — Cost ↓ Capability ↑ Ease of use ↑



Signals & Maps Jul 2018

All GNSS at Once June 2018







'GPS Hackers could send weapons to wrong target.' 17 Oct 2018

Russia claims US spoofed drones to attack base. 25 Oct 2018



## "GNSS alone is insufficient for Safety of Life and other critical applications" — European Union

**PNT Out of Balance** 





## What to Do?

- Protect GPS Signals
  - Interference detection
  - Enforcement
- Toughen Users & Equipment
  - Anti-jam, anti-spoof
  - Standards, requirements, costs



- Augment w/other signals & sources
  - US Govt Announcements 2008, 2015 "eLoran"



The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation is a 501(c)3 scientific and educational charity registered in Virginia www.RNTFnd.org