


# 危険な世界のための弾力的なナビゲーション


(Resilient Navigation for a Dangerous World)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhAh-vpuGCg

# Problem - GNSS is everywhere



"GPS is a single point of failure for Critical Infrastructure" – US Dept. Homeland Security













# Jamming/Denial of Service


















Seconds, Minutes

Weeks +



#### Result 2: GNSS Denial Events







**European Commission Project** 




# **European Commission Project**

STRIKE3

USB L1/L2 jammer


#### STRIKE3 shows Jammer industry is evolving...




5Mhz bandwidth, 1575Mhz centred



8Mhz bandwidth, drifting centre






Waveform detected at 4 STRiKE3 sites Europe and outside EU











# **Spoofing** — Hazardously Misleading Information December 2011






radar echo there.

## June 2017, M/V Atria









Oct 21 2016 - 8310

#### The Kremlin Eats GPS for Breakfast

Why geolocation in central Moscow has become a real headache

October 2016



#### GPS Spoofing Nails Cell Phones in Portland



Oct 2017



June 2018

# Easily Spoofing Them All at Once – Inside GNSS

Spoofing GPS & Your Maps – Next Level of Danger



Virginia Tech & China Institute
July 2018

# **Spoofing** — Cost ↓ Capability ↑ Ease of use ↑



Signals & Maps Jul 2018

# "GNSS alone is insufficient for Safety of Life and other critical applications" — European Union

**PNT Out of Balance** 





## What to Do? -

Protect — GPS Signals

Toughen — Users & Equipment



Augment — w/other signals & sources

# What to do? - Users

# **Protect** — GPS Signals

- Don't Interfere!
- Monitor for interference
- Fix interference







# What to do? - Governments

# TOUGHEN THOUSANDING THOSE THOS

### **Protect** — GPS Signals

- Interference detection
- Enforcement





# What to Do? - Users

# Toughen - Users & Equipment





# What to Do? - Governments

## Toughen - Users & Equipment






Radio Equipment Directive – GNSS Receivers

# What to Do? - All

## Toughen




Thousands Fail After Air Force GPS Change: Receivers Did Not Comply w/ Specification

# What to Do? - Users

# **Augment** – w/other signals & sources







# What to Do? - Governments

# **Augment** – w/other signals & sources



#### In United States:

- Five major studies "eLoran is best/only solution"
- Telecom Industry Stds Assn (ATIS) 2017
  - Telecom needs resilient wireless time <u>now</u>, even more urgent for 5G
    - suggest eLoran

# What to Do? - Governments

# **Augment** — w/other signals & sources

#### In United States



- Presidential Directive
  - Dept. Transportation to acquire backup capability for GPS
- US Laws Passed by Congress
  - Preserve Loran-C Infrastructure pending GPS backup system
  - \$10M provided in 2018 for GPS backup Tech Demo
  - By 2020 Dept. Transportation to establish GPS backup timing
     Mandates a system with characteristics of eLoran

# eLoran – low cost, high performance

- Terrestrial, high-power, low-frequency system
- Modern digital technology
- No common mode of failure with GNSS
- Plug-and-Play Compatible GNSS augmentation
- Accurate positioning
- Precise UTC timing and frequency
- Robust data communications
- Autonomous operation









すべての神の子どもたちは、ポジショニング、ナビ ゲーション、タイミングが 必要です!

The Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation is a 501(c)3 scientific and educational charity registered in Virginia