

Talking Paper: **Achieving Assured PNT (Positioning, Navigation, and Timing)**

- US is massively dependent on GPS/PNT and its economic contribution (about \$1B/day)
 - Thus, GPS is **a major foundation of National Power.**
 - This Validates and Reenforces a US National Goal of “**Assured** PNT”
- For such **assurance**, PNT applications demand differing measures of PNT – we define 5 major capability/application categories – A, B, C, S and T.

The Five PNT User Capability Categories

	A	B	C	S	T
User Category	Advanced Ultra-Precise 3D	Basic Precision 3D	Common or Generic At Least 2D	Survey and Scientific 3D	Time Sync & Transfer 1D
Accuracy (95 th %)	0.1 Meters. <i>Dynamic</i>	2.5 Meters <i>Dynamic</i>	10-25 Meters <i>Dynamic</i>	cm- 0.1mm <i>Static</i>	Static microsec to nanosecond
Examples	Auto Farming, Machine control	Aircraft precision approach	Cell Phones, Watches, Autos	Dimensional Surveying, Plate Tectonics	Banking, Power Grid
Dynamic Users					

4/2/26 Assuring PNT - Strategy and Status © Bradford W. Parkinson 2025 4

One, of many, Essential Characteristic

- While the accuracy characteristic is a useful tag for each concept, other requirements are also essential attributes, such as integrity, availability, and robustness to interference.
- The most significant threats to PNT are Jamming and Spoofing of weak GNSS signal.
- PNTAB **Strategy** is “PTA” – Protect, Toughen, Augment (GPS). **Points about “Toughening”**:
 - CRPAs have the most immediate payoff (reduce jammer effective area by factors of 100,000 or more) but they have had inadequate support for the last 20 years. In fact, prohibition by USG (“ITAR”) has just been finally lifted.
 - “Deep” Inertial augmentations can also reduce effective jammer area by factors up to 10. Note: this is more than the federated techniques usually used.
 - Activation of the GPS L5 signal would provide “Lm – level” natural advantage – Reduce jammer effectiveness area by factor of >25 (reduction by over 96%)
 - Expanding the use of non-GPS GNSS (e.g. Galileo) would significantly improve resilience through proliferation of PNT sources but must include assurances of adequate integrity.
- **Augmentation** is currently fashionable, **but non-GNSS augmentations will not generally satisfy the needs of (i.e. replace GNSS) Categories A, B, and S.**
 - Experimental demonstrations are useful but inadequate to evaluate a specific augmentation. **A complete System Definition is required.** All proposed augmentations must be scrutinized (**independently tested** and verified) in the same way as GPS-Accuracy, Affordability, Availability (geographic and temporal), Dimensionality, Integrity, Continuity, Time to field (both system and user devices), commitment for system sustainment, and Toughness/Vulnerability.
- To achieve “Assured PNT”, US needs a visionary leader with *authority and resources* to ensure future GPS capability and assure PNT **for all users.**